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TINKERING WITH THE INVENTION
STANDARD: NO SOLUTION TO
PROBLEMS OF PATENT QUALITY
Mary Helen Sears*
Professor Harold Marquis of Emory University published an
article at page 67 of this Volume, in which he proposed a dual
patent system and other changes in patent legislation. The fol-
lowing article has been written in response to that proposal.
Like the proverbial bad penny, the suggestion to permit the
patenting of trivia under United States law periodically reap-
pears, notwithstanding its failure to meet with either legislative
or judicial favor throughout the nearly two hundred years since
the adoption of the Constitution. While there are many reasons
for these periodic reappearances, a major factor is sustained ad-
ministrative apathy toward enforcement of the patent law to
deny patents on trivia. The continued dissemination by the
Patent Office of unjustified and unjustifiable patents-monopo-
lies in the truest sense-is unfortunately welcomed by significant
segments of the business community and the bar, who perceive
an opportunity to profit from wholesale proliferation of monopo-
lies and accordingly seek to legitimatize trivial patents. The ob-
ject of this Article is to refute the suggestion that such action
could be compatible with the constitutional strictures on the
patent system and to otherwise demonstrate the unacceptability
of the proposals.
I. THE DISSONANCE BETWEEN THE PATENT OFFICE
AND THE COURTS AS TO PATENTABILITY OF TRIVIA
In section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952, Congress provided:
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences be-
tween the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior
art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.1
Declaring this provision to be a constitutional exercise of the
limited congressional power to legislate in the patent field, the
* Partner, Irons & Sears, Washington, D.C.
1. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970).
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Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co. 2 complained of the
"notorious difference"3 between the patentability standards ap-
plied by the Patent Office in the issuance of patents and those
utilized by the courts in the adjudication of patent validity. The
Court admonished the Patent Commissioner "to strictly adhere
to [section 103 of] the 1952 Act as interpreted here."4  In so
doing, the Court reiterated the substance of its own pronounce-
ments interdicting the patenting of trivia, which, as the opinion
noted,5 extend back to its 1850 decision in Hotchkiss v. Green-
wood.6 The Court reaffirmed its judgment that the Constitution
mandates the Hotchkiss prohibition on the grant of the patent
monopoly as a reward for the development of trivial improve-
ments7 Such improvements, though "new" and "useful," add
nothing to the sum of human knowledge; they are achieved
through the exercise of ordinary skill in the utilization and adap-
tation of existing knowledge.3 These new but obvious variations
on, or combinations of, what is basically old do not "promote
the progress of science and useful arts,"9 as required by the Con-
2. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
3. Id. at 18.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 10-17.
6. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
7. This judgment was first specifically expressed by the Court in
Hollister v. Benedict & Burnham Mg. Co., 113 U.S. 59, 73 (1885), and
Thompson v. Boisselier, 114 U.S. 1, 11 (1885). It has been reiterated at
least in Hill v. Wooster, 132 U.S. 693, 701 (1890); Cuno Eng'r Corp. v.
Automotive Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966); and Ander-
son's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
8. Several examples of the trivial advances or improvements that
the Court has held insufficient to support a valid patent suffice to illus-
trate what is not, never has been, and should not be capable of support-
ing a valid patent:
(a) the clay doorknob at issue in Hotchkiss itself, which,
though "better and cheaper" than an antecedent wooden door-
knob of identical design, required only mechanical skill to de-
vise;
(b) the cordless cigarette lighter in Cuno, which depended
on the combination of an old heating unit and an old thermostat-
ically controlled circuit breaker, a combination that was an ob-
vious exercise of ordinary mechanical skill;
(c) the bottomless three-sided tray in A&P that was de-
signed to pull groceries along a counter, a device manifestly re-
quiring only a pedestrian level of mechanical skill to create;
(d) the child's feeding dish in Crest Specialty v. Trager, 341
U.S. 912 (1951), having on its rim a figure of a pig appearing
to be fed, which was intended to coax a child into eating, a de-
vice held unpatentable in a one-line, per curiam decision.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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stitution. Hence such trivia do not satisfy the constitutional
standard.
The constitutional standard for patentable invention, as the
Graham Court correctly recognized, "has remained invariable" in
the Supreme Court.10  The application of this standard com-
menced only months after the adoption of the Constitution itself,
with the administration of the Patent Act of 179011 by a three-
member board, on which Thomas Jefferson served.1 2 The Patent
Office, established by the Patent Act of 1836,'13 has paid reason-
ably consistent lip service to this constitutional standard,1 4 but, at
least in recent times, has failed to observe or apply it, lapsing in-
stead into the use of a criterion approaching mere novelty as the
basis for determining whether a patent shall issue.15 Available
10. 383 U.S. at 19. This is not to say that individual judges in the
lower federal courts and Justices in the Supreme Court itself have not
departed from the standard at times, nor is it suggested that members
of the judiciary, unlike other members of the human race, are immune
from making mistakes. Rather, as the Graham Court recognized, the le-
gal standard for patentable invention has remained unvarying in Su-
preme Court pronouncements from Hotchkiss to the present-a not at
all remarkable phenomenon since the standard rests on a solid constitu-
tional foundation. See Irons & Sears, The Constitutional Standard of In-
vention-The Touchstone for Patent Reform, 1973 UTAH L. REv. 653.
11. Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.
12. The relationship of the rules evolved by the patent board be-
tween 1790 and 1793, see note 17 infra and text accompanying note 44
infra, to the constitutional standard of invention was expressly recog-
nized in Graham. 383 U.S. at 10-11.
13. Ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117.
14. The actual decisions of Patent Office tribunals in refusing patent
applications are presently secret; thus scholarly efforts to examine the
premises on which they have rested are frustrated. In particular, Irons
v. Schuyler, 465 F.2d 608, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1972), reveals that some 175
bound volumes of such decisions covering the years 1853 to 1954, plus
countless unbound decisions since 1954, have been thus concealed from
the public.
When Patent Office performance is measured by the quality of is-
sued patents, it is apparent that at least some examiners used a patenta-
bility criterion approaching mere novelty even in the early years of the
Patent Office-otherwise the patent under scrutiny in Hotchkiss, for ex-
ample, would never have been issued. See Great At. & Pac. Tea Co.
v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 155-58 (1950) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
15. Both admirers and critics of the Patent Office standard agree
that this is so. As stated in Marquis, Improving the Quality Control for
Patents, 59 MimN. L. REv. 67, 104 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Marquis],
"[s] ympathy for inventors, the ex parte nature of the examination proc-
ess, and a heavy work load have caused the Patent Office to apply a
standard of invention approaching mere novelty" (emphasis added).
This conclusion is also reached-not only by reason of the ex parte
nature of the examination process but also by reason of factors not men-
tioned by Marquis-in Sears, One Litigation Lawyer's View of Ex Parte
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statistics show that about 75 to 80 percent of all patent applica-
tions currently filed in the United States mature into patents 1 -a
manifest impossibility if the sophisticated level of present skill
and knowledge in technological arts were realistically considered
by the Patent Office in evaluating patentability.17
Not surprisingly, the Patent Office, applying a mere novelty
criterion, issues ever increasing numbers of patents on trivial ad-
Secret Patent Procedures, 2 APLA Q.J. 242, 251-52 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Sears].
16. The most recent statistics were published in the Patent, Trade-
mark and Copyright Journal (a Bureau of National Affairs publication)
on September 13, 1973, and cover the year 1971. Similarly, the Washing-
ton Star, Mar. 10, 1975, § A, at 1, col. 1, reported that "last year" the
Patent Office received 103,979 applications and granted 78,898 patents.
In contrast, the Bureau of National Affairs statistics showed that in 1971
West Germany issued patents on only about one-third of the applications
it received, while in Japan the rate of issuance was about 40 percent.
17. For example, the weekly Official Gazette of the Patent Office
for February 11, 1975, reported issuance on that day of patents on such
items as a combination pen and pencil, an automobile window shade,
a reclining chair, a mobile doghouse styled as a "pet trailer," a long han-
dled "weed-puller," a potato masher, several forms of paper or plastic
bags, a toilet paper roll holder, a book strap, a collar stay, a dress form,
several forms of aerosol spray caps and spray dispensers, several forms
of bottle caps, several forms of display cartons, and several types of con-
vertible furniture. The simple nature of these items makes it difficult
to believe that the ingenuity expended in their creation could have ex-
ceeded that required for the application of ordinary skill to common
knowledge in the mechanical field.
The difficulty increases if one ponders Jefferson's account of the 1790
patent board's "general rules" for "drawing a line between the things
which are worth to the public, the embarrassment of an exclusive patent
and those which are not":
One of these was, that a machine of which we were possessed,
might be applied by every man to any use of which it is sus-
ceptible, and that this right ought not to be taken from him and
given to a monopolist, because the first perhaps had occasion
so to apply it. Thus a screw for crushing plaster might be em-
ployed for crushing corn-cobs. And a chain-pump for raising
water might be used for raising wheat: this being merely a
change of application. Another rule was that a change of mate-
rial should not give title to a patent. As the making a plough-
share of cast rather than of wrought iron; a comb of iron instead
of horn or of ivory, or the connecting buckets by a band of
leather rather than of hemp or iron. A third was that a mere
change of form should give no right to a patent, as a high-quar-
tered shoe instead of a low one; a round hat instead of a three-
square; or a square bucket instead of a round one. But for this
rule, all the changes of fashion in dress would have been under
the tax of patentees.
6 THE WuTinGs o' Tuois JErOERsoN 181-82 (H. Washington ed. 1871).
In short, the Patent Office currently grants patents which Jefferson
and the first patent board would have flatly refused as not meeting the
constitutional standard if viewed against the present state of art and sci-
ence.
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vances that do not meet the constitutional standard for patent-
able invention.' While only about one percent of all the patents
which the Patent Office grants are of sufficient commercial in-
terest to come to the attention of the courts,19 well over one-
18. The reply brief in Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chem. Co., decided
with Graham, 383 U.S. at 26-37, focused sharply on "the practice of the
Patent Office in patenting trivial modifications, if they are narrowly
stated," Reply Brief for Petitioner at 8, and emphasized in a footnote
that "it is impossible to understand why a patent of the sort involved
here ever issued without some general view of the manifest proclivity
of the Patent Office for issuing patents on any trivial device or trivial
modification of a device on which there is not the most direct of antici-
pations." Id. n.6. This "general view" was provided in the same foot-
note:
The Patent Office seems to view its performance in terms of the
number of patents it can turn out. Commissioner of Patents Ed-
ward J. Brenner recently indicated with pride that "the percent-
age of applications allowed in Fiscal 1965 was approximately
68%, as compared with 63% for the preceding year."
Evidently there are production goals or norms or some other
sort of stakhanovite system in the Patent Office respecting the
production of patents, for the Commissioner said further: "I am
pleased to note that our overall average for indicating allowable
claims and allowable subject matter in first actions is nearly
50% of the first actions, which is our overall goal in this respect.
A large number of our Groups are now meeting their particular
goals of indicating allowable claims or subject matter in first
actions at a level equivalent to 75% of the ultimate allowance
level for their particular group. It is hoped that the other
Groups will also be able to meet their particular goals in this
regard in the near future."
We do not wish to create the impression that there are no
limits in the Office on the issuance of patents. The Commission-
er's speech definitely indicates one limitation. "We also antici-
pate that we will issue approximately 67,000 patents in Fiscal
1966, which represents the approximate limit of the Government
Printing Office to print patents." (Address before Patent,
Trademark and Copyright Section, ABA, Miami, August 7, 1965,
Dep't of Commerce Release, pp. 3, 7).
Id.
The latest statistics, see note 16 supra, show that the capacity of the
Government Printing Office for printing patents has increased in the nine
years since the Graham-Calmar decision, but that very little else has
changed.
19. Knowledgeable industry representatives from Zenith Corpora-
tion and Avco Corporation, testifying before Congress in 1973, agreed
that the remaining 99 percent of issued patents are not even used, with
the result that the question of their validity is academic and unlikely
to be raised. See Hearings on S. 1321 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 142, 155-56 (1973).
The counterargument that only questionable patents are litigated,
see, e.g., id. at 580, can be given little credence, notwithstanding the lack
of published evidence on either side. Candid, informal discussion of the
subject with top-level corporate patent counsel and with lawyers who
specialize in patent litigation invariably leads to agreement with the tes-
timony of the Zenith and Avco representatives. Many patent lawyers,
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half and probably closer to three-fourths of the patents that are
litigated are held to be invalid.20 There is general agreement
that remedial action is needed to bring about closer concurrence
between administrative and judicial precedent 2' and to root out
unpatentable subject matter at the Patent Office level. 22 Con-
siderable disagreement exists, however, as to the type of remedial
action that should be undertaken. Disagreement exists even as
to whether the Patent Office should be required to conform to
the Constitution, the statute, and Supreme Court precedent, or
whether the latter should be altered to conform to the novelty
standard of the Patent Office.
II. SUGGESTIONS FOR LEGITIMATIZING
TRIVIAL PATENTS
The organized patent bar23 began at least as early as the
however, appear reluctant to speak out for publication, perhaps because
of an unexpressed fear that a higher Patent Office standard of invention
would inevitably lead to fewer patents, then to fewer patent applications,
and hence to less need for their own services.
20. Statistics for the years 1968 through 1972, presented by the Pat-
ent Office in connection with the 1973 hearings on S. 1321, represent,
somewhat optimistically, that the proportion of litigated patents held in-
valid during the stated period was on the order of 50 percent. Id. at
196-98. Statistics covering a larger sampling period, which are believed
to have been more objectively compiled, are reported in I. KAYTON, THE
CRisis Or LAW iN PATENTS, pt. I, at 5 and app. 2, at 13-14 (1970). The
latter statistics reveal that the proportion of invalid patents among those
litigated during a slightly earlier but overlapping time period was on
the order of 72 percent.
Statistics covering only Supreme Court adjudications for the period
1876 to 1954 appear in G. FRosT, SU-COMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS
AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE Comm. ON THE JUDicIARY, 84TH CONG., 2D
SEss., THE PATENT SYSTEM AND THE MODERN EcONOMY, STUDY No. 2, at
59 (Comm. Print. 1957). These statistics reveal that the Court has con-
sistently ruled against the patentability standard utilized by the Patent
Office, with well in excess of 60 percent of the patents reaching it
throughout the period being declared invalid.
21. See Marquis, supra note 15; Sears, supra note 15. See also
Hearings, supra note 19, wherein persons of widely divergent viewpoints
representing patent bar groups, industry, the Patent Office, and other
government agencies, as well as private practitioners, professors, and
patent examiners speaking individually, all agreed that changes were
needed, but sharply disagreed as to what their substance should be.
22. The Supreme Court noted in Graham that "[tlo await litigation
is-for all practical purposes-to debilitate the patent system." 383 U.S.
at 18. The debilitation process, unfortunately, has been proceeding for
as long as the Patent Office has disdained to follow the constitutional
standard of patentable invention and hence may now be so far advanced
that the system is beyond resuscitation. Before concluding that this is
the case, however, it seems reasonable that efforts should be made to
restore the system to full vigor.
23. As used herein, "organized patent bar" refers to the American
[Vol. 59:965
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1940's to lobby for a statutory standard of patentable invention
conforming to the standard approaching mere novelty used by
the Patent Office. Having failed in 1952 to secure from Congress
an affirmation of this diluted standard, this organized bar en-
deavored in Graham v. John Deere Co. to convince the Supreme
Court to recant its previous pronouncements and to decree that
the 1952 statute 4 had lowered the standard of patentable inven-
tion.25  When this attempt, too, failed and the Court adhered
forcefully to its earlier pronouncements,2 6 the organized patent
Patent Law Association; the Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law Sec-
tion of the American Bar Association; the National Council of Patent
Law Associations; the various regional groups styled as patent law "sec-
tions," "associations," and "clubs"; and various organizations with large
contingents of patent lawyer members that are or have been particularly
vocal with respect to proposed patent legislation. These groups include
the Society for the Advancement of Invention and Innovation; the Li-
censing Executives Society, which, though now a worldwide organization,
has a large United States branch with a high proportion of patent lawyer
members; the organization known as "Intellectual Property Owners,
Inc."; and a substantial number of organizations which are ostensibly
oriented toward concerns other than patents but which nevertheless
speak on patent questions through or at the behest of patent lawyer
members. The latter group of organizations includes the National As-
sociation of Manufacturers, the American Chemical Society, the Manufac-
turing Chemists Association, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associa-
tion, the Electronic Industries Association, the United States Chamber
of Commerce, and many others.
Many of the named groups, all of which are active lobbyists on pat-
ent policy questions today, did not exist in the 1940's or else were not
involved in the lobbying efforts of that time. Several of the newer
groups are exclusively devoted to such lobbying. Other groups not pri-
marily oriented toward patents and so-called "intellectual property"
have become interested in patent legislation because of efforts by certain
of their patent lawyer members to induce them to support the organized
patent bar, not because of any sustained concern on the part of rank
and file members, most of whom are not well-informed about patents.
24. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970). See text accompanying note 1 supra.
25. The Court in Graham actually decided three cases: Graham v.
John Deere Co., Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chem. Co., and Colgate Palmol-
ive Co. v. Cook Chem. Co. These three cases, as well as United States
v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966), were concurrently briefed and argued in
the Supreme Court and were disposed of in decisions rendered on the
same day. Efforts by the organized patent bar to convince the Court
that section 103 should be construed as a mandate to lower the standard
of invention were embodied in five amicus briefs filed in the names of
the American Bar Association, the Illinois State Bar Association, the New
York Patent Law Association, the Patent, Trademark and Copyright Sec-
tion of the State Bar of Texas, and E. Ernest Goldstein, then a professor
of law at the University of Texas.
26. Not only did the Graham Court squarely disavow the contention
that the standard of invention had been lowered, but the Court reempha-
sized three years later that the standard is unvarying and of constitu-
tional origin. Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396
U.S. 57 (1969).
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bar again turned to lobbying in the Congress-an effort it has
now pursued for at least nine years, during which "patent re-
form" legislation has been under consideration.2 7
One approach to legitimatizing the Patent Office grant of
monopolies for trivial advances has been the suggestion that sec-
tion 103 be rewritten to expressly permit many types of trivial
patents that are invalid under existing court decisions.28  This
approach has not found favor in Congress and, although by no
means abandoned, seems to have been sidetracked in favor of less
heavy-handed methods of reaching essentially the same result.
An approach favored by some of the organized patent bar
is the establishment of a "dual" or two-tiered patent system, in
which two classes of patents would be available.2 9 One type of
patent, sometimes called a "petty patent," would issue for a shor-
tened term on concededly trivial subject matter in implementa-
tion of a standard of invention deliberately set at the level of
mere novelty, while a second type of patent of longer term would
issue only if a more stringent patentability standard were satis-
fied.
The dual patent system has been proposed in many vari-
ants.30 A recent proposal by Professor Harold Marquis of Emory
27. Consideration in Congress of so-called "patent reform" legisla-
tion began with the issuance in 1966 of the Report of the Commission
on the Patent System appointed by former President Johnson and has
proceeded since that time. A number of divergent bills have to date
been introduced, including, e.g., S. 1042 and S. 2597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.(1967); S. 3892, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); S. 2756, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.(1969); S. 643, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 1321 and S. 2504, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973); S. 2930, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); and S. 23, S. 473,
and S. 1308, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
28. A representative proposed modification of the statute retains the
essence of the present statute, see text accompanying note 1 supra, but
includes added provisions:
Patentability shall not be negatived... because the invention
has simplicity or is the last step in an evolutionary development,
nor because it is not revolutionary, basic, scientific, or technical
in character. Claims for a new combination or assemblage of
known mechanical or other elements shall be subjected to the
same standard of patentability as is applied to claims for other
types of subject matter.
S. 2930, H.R. 11868, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 103 (1974).
29. The proponents of these measures are not necessarily different
groups. The Patent, Trademark and Copyright Section of the American
Bar Association favors both the amendment to section 103 set forth in
note 28 supra, see Hearings, supra note 19, at 572, and the dual system.
See note 30 infra and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Mott, The Concept of Small Patent in European Legal
Systems and Equivalent Protection under United States Law, 49 VA. L.
REV. 232 (1963). See also SEcTior or PATENT, TaDnmssPx Arm Copy-
[Vol. 59:965
19751 PATENT QUALITY STANDARDS
University 3' contemplates a two-tiered patent system in which
"improvement patents," of short-term duration such as five
years, would be granted on alleged inventions which meet "the
present [Patent Office] nonobviousness standard"32-the stand-
ard "approaching mere novelty" interdicted in Graham-while
"basic patents" could be obtained for a seventeen-year term only
on alleged inventions representing "a significant technical ad-
vance" and exhibiting the "ordinary inventive skill of the scien-
tist engaged in research."3 3  "Improvement patents" would be
limited in each instance to a "single embodiment," but "basic
patents" would not.34 Marquis would permit simultaneous appli-
cation for both a "basic" and an "improvement" patent on the
same subject matter and would allow conversion of either type
of application to the other type at any time, even after issuance
of a patent.35 Marquis further proposes what amounts to a con-
tinuing post-issuance Patent Office examination of both "basic"
and "improvement" patent claims, in which claims could be
amended or cancelled or entire patents revoked.36 A major fea-
ture of the proposal is that the ex parte secret procedural
mechanisms that now characterize all proceedings in the Patent
Office except interferences would be continued and even ex-
tended.37
RIGHT LAw, AmERIcAN BAR AssocIATioN, 1974 SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS
68-70, 110-12 (Resolution 54, adopted by a 52-50 vote at the August 1974
meeting).
31. Marquis, supra note 15.
32. Id. at 73. See also id. at 68, 69, 71.
33. Id. at 72.
34. Id. at 74.
35. Id. at 77. This part of the proposal is similar to the ABA Sec-
tion's Resolution 54, see note 30 supra, except that the ABA resolution
does not contemplate post-issuance conversion and is careful to specify
that a petty patent would be infringed only by* an item substantially
identical to the claimed subject matter. The resolution would thus pre-
clude invocation of the equitable doctrine of equivalents, see, e.g., Graver
Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950), by which
the scope of constitutionally valid patents is construed to embrace con-
structive as well as literal infringements, to expand the petty patent
monopoly.
The ABA resolution would avoid the practical problems of inde-
terminate claim scope that would attend post-issuance conversion and
reexamination proceedings. The Marquis proposal, on the other hand,
pays considerable attention to the possible problems of discrepancies in
"basic" and "improvement" patent terms, but virtually ignores the more
troublesome effects of kaleidoscopic claim scope changes. See text ac-
companying notes 113-15 infra.
36. Marquis, supra note 15, at 90-104.
37. Indeed, Marquis seems to view the ex parte secret procedure
as sacrosanct, since he deems it an insurmountable obstacle to requiring
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Like other proposals for dual patent systems, the Marquis
proposal is a stratagem by which proponents of the indiscrimi-
nate award of economic monopolies for the advancement of busi-
ness and commercial interests hope to induce Congress, under
the guise of the appealing "patent" label, to ignore the Constitu-
tion as interpreted by the Supreme Court. Acceptance of the
proposal would invert the order of priorities which is the essence
of a free society by subordinating the individual rights of all
the members of the community to the privileges of a relatively
few intrepreneurs. There is no evidence of any correlation be-
tween the creativity that the patent system was constitutionally
designed to reward and the "research" and "investment" in re-
search that the Marquis proposal seeks to stimulate.38 There is
not even any evidence, much less a guarantee, that the Marquis
proposal would, or could, stimulate either "research" or "invest-
ment" in research. It seems far more likely that its effect, if
any, would be to encourage the generation of yet more trivia
and the filing of greater numbers of applications for patents on
trivia. In addition, there is every indication that acceptance of
the Marquis proposal would lead to vastly increased confusion
in the law and would multiply the burdens on the already over-
burdened Patent Office.
III. THE UNVARYING MINIMUM STANDARD
OF PATENTABLE INVENTION
REQUIRED BY THE CONSTITUTION
It is axiomatic that Congress is authorized by the Constitu-
tion to promulgate a patent system only to "promote the progress
of science and useful arts. '3 9 The first Congress, which enacted
the Patent Office to conform to the patentability standard decreed in
Graham and other Supreme Court precedents. Without citation of evi-
dence to support this secrecy assumption, Marquis asserts that "[a]ny
efforts by the Patent Office to refine its standards of patentability and
to conform them to the standard of nonobviousness applied by the judici-
ary are inhibited by a lack of resources and the limitations of ex parte
proceedings." Id. at 68.
For a proposal that Patent Office procedures be modernized by the
abolition of secrecy and the institution of inter partes examination pro-
cedures that would eventually decrease the number of applications filed,
enhance the resources available to the Office, and permit its operation
in conformity with the constitutional standard of patentable invention,
see Sears, supra note 15.
38. Marquis, supra note 15, at 71.
39. The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries.
[Vol. 59:965
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the Patent Act of 1790, contained a significant complement of
constitutional framers as well as contemporaries thoroughly fa-
miliar with the limited nature of the power imparted by the pat-
ent clause.40 That Congress correctly perceived that "progress,"
or advancement of "science and useful arts," could not be achieved
by indiscriminately rewarding everything "new" with a patent
monopoly.41 Hence the Congress provided that a patent could
be awarded only if the alleged invention were also "sufficiently
useful and important."42 The Act required the patent board
established thereunder to determine objectively whether each
patent application defined an invention that was not only new
and useful, but sufficiently useful and important to "promote"
science and useful arts.4 3 Thomas Jefferson, one of the members
of that board, preserved in his writings detailed information re-
garding the specific criteria that the board utilized in making
these determinations. 44 These criteria disqualified: (1) aggrega-
tions of old elements into new objects where each element per-
formed its old role; (2) objects "new" only in that they were
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Proponents of patents on trivia have argued
with some vigor that this clause was intended as a "balanced sentence,"
in which "Science" meant "knowledge" and was germane only to the
copyright power concurrently conferred upon Congress, while the patent
power was applicable to grants in the "useful Arts"-including "gadgets"
and trivia. On that premise, arguments have been advanced that the
present Patent Office standard of patentability approaching mere novelty
can be constitutionally justified. See, e.g., Brief for ABA as Amicus
Curiae, Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966); Lutz, The Consti-
tution v. The Supreme Court-Re: Patents for Inventions, 13 U. Pxrr. L.
REV. 449, 452 (1952).
The cornerstone of the argument-that science meant "knowledge"
at the time the Constitution was adopted and hence had nothing to do
with patents-is perhaps best refuted by section 3 of the Patent Act of
1793. That Act required every patent applicant to supply a written de-
scription of his alleged invention and of the manner of using it in such
complete terms as "to ... enable any person skilled in the art or science,
of which it is a branch, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
make, . .. and use the same." Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 3,
1 Stat. 321 (emphasis added). In Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 292,
320 (1833), the Supreme Court recognized the patent laws to be directed
to "the range of discoveries in the mechanic arts, in science, and in all
things which promote the public convenience. .. ." (emphasis added).
Consonantly, the Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, incorporated
the quoted portion of the 1793 Act.
40. The clause "is both a grant of power and a limitation." Graham
v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).
41. Cf., e.g., note 17 supra.
42. Act of April 11, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109.
43. Id.
44. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-11 (1966), and au-
thorities cited therein.
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of changed design, form, shape, material, or the like; and (3)
applications of old objects, including machinery, to new uses. In
each case, as is readily apparent, these insufficiently important
items were available through the mere application of ordinary
skill in the adaptation of what was already known. The test of
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,45 codified in section 103,46 is simply a
generic restatement of these criteria.
The patent act in effect from 1793 to 1836 replaced the "suf-
ficiently useful and important" standard with the more explicit
mandate "that simply changing the form or the proportions of
any machine, or composition of matter, in any degree, shall not
be deemed a discovery, '47 thus incorporating a standard for
patentable invention which the patent board had implemented
during its tenure.= 8 The 1793 act, however, aborted. Its failure
was attributed primarily to the absence in its provisions of any
requirement for pre-issuance examination of patent applications.
The automatic registration of patents which proceeded under this
act between 1793 and 1836 greatly facilitated fraudulent activities
by unscrupulous copyists and resulted in a virtual plague of
monopolies akin to that which had victimized Elizabethan Eng-
land and eventually had prompted the 1624 enactment of the
Statute of Monopolies.49 According to the Senate report accom-
panying the Act of July 4, 1836:
45. [U]nless more ingenuity and skill . .. were required ...
than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with
the business, there was an absence of that degree of skill and
ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention.
In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful
mechanic, not that of the inventor.
52 U.S. (11 How.) at 267.
46. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
47. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 321.
48. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
49. One of the more pronounced abuses of English monarchical
monopoly power occurred during the reign of Elizabeth I, when grants
of monopoly power over old commodities, such as salt and playing cards,
were rampant. These grants were made for the benefit of a few favorites
of the Crown, in direct derogation of rights of the community at large.
In The Vague Concept of "Invention" as Replaced by § 103 of the 1952
Patent Act, 8 IDEA 136 (1964), Judge Giles S. Rich, a leading proponent
of the grant of United States patents on trivia, readily conceded that
these Elizabethan monopolies on "old" products were "bad." As Jeffer-
son recognized in the early 1790's when the Constitution was still new-
and as Congress and the Supreme Court have consistently decreed-
monopolies are equally odious when they cover products which, though
technically "new," differ so little from what is old as to have been read-
ily within the purview of those of ordinary skill in the pertinent art or
science.
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The present law waits till infringements and frauds are con-
summated-nay, it even aids them; and then it offers an inade-
quate remedy for the injury, by giving an action for damages.
It ought, rather, by refusing to grant interfering patents, to ren-
der prosecutions unnecessary. Instead of sanctioning the wrong
by granting the privilege to commit it, it should arrest injury
and injustice at the threshold, and put an end to litigation be-
fore it begins. 50
The generally unsatisfactory experience under the 1793 act
was undoubtedly a factor in the abandonment of its explicit Jef-
fersonian standard for patentable invention. The 1836 act rein-
stated the "sufficiently useful and important" criterion first ex-
pressed in 1790.51 The relationship between this statutory re-
quirement for sufficient usefulness and importance and the "re-
quirement for invention" which first surfaced in the Supreme
Court's decision in Hotchkiss was clearly set out in Reckendorfer
v. Faber.2 The Court rejected the argument of the patentee's
counsel "that the decision of the commissioner, as to the extent
of the utility or importance of the improvement, shall be con-
clusive upon that point"53 and took the occasion to emphasize
that "extent of the utility or importance" was the very point
decided in Hotchkiss and in an unbroken line of subsequent
cases. 4 Equating "no importance" to "no invention," the Court
stated:
The argument ... that proof that there is no invention or dis-
covery at all, or that the invention has no importance, cannot
be made [by the defendant in an infringement action], is quite
unsound. Proof that there is no invention or discovery strikes
at the root of the whole claim. The patent is based on an af-
firmative fact, of which this is the direct negative. It needed
no statute to aid or justify this defense. It is provable when
it exists under any general denial, like the fact of not guilty...
in cases where guilt ... is first to be established. 55
With the codification of the Hotchkiss test itself in section
103 of the 1952 Patent Act,56 Congress omitted the statutory re-
50. S. REP. No. 338, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1836). The entire report
is reprinted in 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 853 (1953).
51. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 7, 5 Stat. 117 (emphasis added).
52. 92 U.S. 347 (1875).
53. Id. at 351.
54. Id. at 352-54. See Smith v. Nichols, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 112
(1875); Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498 (1874);
Hailes v. Van Wormer, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 353 (1874); Hicks v. Kelsey,
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 670 (1874); Stimpson v. Woodman, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.)
117 (1870). Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516 (1871), was
specifically said to be "no exception," 92 U.S. at 354, though apparently
urged by the patentee to support a different rule.
55. 92 U.S. at 354 (emphasis added).
56. While the Hotchkiss decision did not use the word "obvious"
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quirement that patents could be granted only for "sufficiently
useful and important" subject matter "as unnecessary, the re-
quirements for patentability being stated in sections 101, 102 and
103."15 As the Graham Court recognized, "the revision was not
intended by Congress to change the general level of patentable
invention,"5 8 which-as the Court had several times held 5 01-is
governed by "the standard expressed in the Constitution."60
This constitutional standard necessarily nullifies any legislation
designed to "authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to
remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict
free access to materials already available."061 Hence, it disqual-
ifies any legislation that would implement the "improvement
patent" tier of the Marquis dual system.
IV. THE INVALID PREMISES OF THE DUAL
PATENT PROPOSAL
A. THE PREMISE THAT THE STANDARD OF PATENTABILITY SHOULD
BE CHANGED FOR "BASIC" PATENTS
Professor Marquis argues that the second tier of his proposed
dual patent system "may be more consonant with the patent
clause of the Constitution than the present system" in promoting
technological progress, because it would require an inventive
level on a par with that of the "scientist engaged in research. 0, -2
It is not clear in context whether "present system" refers to the
present Patent Office system utilizing a criterion approaching
mere novelty or to the present constitutional standard of inven-
tion applied by the courts. If the former is meant, then the Mar-
quis second tier, "basic" patents would require more than novelty
and hence would more closely approach the constitutional stan-
dard. How nearly they would do so is unclear, and in any event
no reason can be discerned for promulgating a new patentability
to describe new subject matter insufficiently important to promote prog-
ress, many pre-1952 cases, citing and following H'otchkiss or progeny of
Hotchkiss, did so. See, e.g., Saranac Automatic Mach. Corp. v. Wire-
bounds Patent Co., 282 U.S. 704, 711 (1931); Concrete Appliances Co. v.
Gomery, 269 U.S. 177, 184-85 (1925); Pearce v. Mulford, 102 U.S. 112,
118 (1880).
57. Revisor's Note to 35 U.S.C. § 131 (1970).
58. 383 U.S. at 17.
59. See cases cited in note 7 supra.
60. 383 U.S. at 6. For a more detailed discussion of this standard,
see Irons & Sears, supra note 10.
61. 383 U.S. at 6.
62. Marquis, supra note 15, at 72.
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standard when the constitutional standard applied by the courts
has worked for almost two centuries. If the constitutional stand-
ard is what is meant, however (and the implication is that the
"ordinary scientist engaged in research" is a cut or two above
the "ordinary mechanic"), then it is necessary to examine the
present constitutional standard as applied by the courts to see
whether the one now proposed by Marquis is higher or would
better promote progress.
The Graham Court concluded that the present constitutional
standard does promote progress in the constitutional sense be-
cause of the very dynamism implicit in the ever enlarging scope
of public knowledge and the constantly rising level of ordinary
skill. Observing that "[t] echnology... has advanced... with
remarkable rapidity in the last 50 years [and] the ambit of appli-
cable art in given fields of science has widened by disciplines
unheard of a half century ago,"63 the Court admonished would-
be inventors (and their financial backers) to show "an awareness
of these changed conditions. '6 4 The Court specifically cautioned
that "[h] e who seeks to build a better mousetrap today has a long
path to tread before reaching the Patent Office." 65 This admoni-
tion essentially reiterated the warning in the concurring opinion
of Justices Douglas and Black in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp.,6 6 calling for an end to the
proliferation by the Patent Office of "incredible," "flimsy," and
"spurious" 67 patents on "gadgets that obviously have .. . no
place in the constitutional scheme of advancing scientific knowl-
edge."68 The specific instances of "gadgets" cited 69 are remark-
ably similar to the trivia on which the Patent Office is still
granting patents, relentlessly applying its own "mere novelty"
criterion.7 0
As the Court has consistently recognized, strict application
of the ordinary skill test of patentability ensures a high standard
of invention. The Court noted in Atlantic Works v. Brady:7 1
The process of development in manufactures creates a con-
stant demand for new appliances, which the skill of ordinary
head-workmen and engineers is generally adequate to devise,
63. 383 U.S. at 19.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
67. Id. at 158.
68. Id. at 156.
69. Id. at 156-58.
70. See notes 15 and 17 supra.
71. 107 U.S. 192 (1883).
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and which, indeed, are the natural and proper outgrowth of such
development. Each step forward prepares the way for the next,
and each is usually taken by spontaneous trials and attempts in
a hundred different places. To grant to a single party a monop-
oly of every slight advance made, except where the exercise of
invention, somewhat above ordinary mechanical or engineering
skill, is distinctly shown, is unjust in principle and injurious in
its consequences.7 2
"Ordinary head-workmen and engineers" must, of course, be con-
sidered as representative of the whole class of artisans of
ordinary skill, including ordinary research scientists. Because
this is so, the "ordinary scientist engaged in research" is simply
a worker "having ordinary skill in the art" within the meaning
of section 103.
It is accordingly difficult to see how the Marquis "basic
patent" proposal could raise the present invention standard or
better promote progress. Indeed, it seems likely that "basic
patents" would reflect an invention requirement lower than the
present constitutional standard. Marquis suggests that "basic"
inventions be evaluated, not by resort to the "basic factual in-
quiries" defined in Graham,73 but on the basis of "opinion testi-
mony of scientists."7 4  Thus, the objective test of section 103
would be replaced by the subjective judgment of the applicant's
peers.
It is not clearly stated, but it also seems likely that Marquis
is aiming at a static invention standard for both tiers of patents,
whereby the dynamism that has kept the constitutional standard
of invention viable for almost two centuries of unprecedented
technological progress would no longer automatically adjust to
higher levels of knowledge and skill. Certainly the lower tier
invention standard for "improvement patents" granted on merely
novel subject matter would be static and would permit the mo-
nopolization of endless trifling variations upon known subject
matter. The suggestion that "the opinion testimony of scientists
... perhaps would serve to increase the predictability of deci-
72. Id. at 199-200. Atlantic Works was specifically reaffirmed by
the Supreme Court in Cuno Eng'r Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314
U.S. 84, 92 (1941). It was quoted with approval in the concurring opin-
ion of Justices Douglas and Black in Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Super-
market Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 155 (1950), an opinion that was in
turn adopted by the Court in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6(1966), and in Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396
U.S. 57, 61 (1969).
73. 383 U.S. at 17.
74. Marquis, supra note 15, at 72.
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sion"75 as to basic patents hints that some ceiling is contemplated
for the present increasingly demanding constitutional standard
embodied in section 103 and that this is the reason for switching
from the "ordinary mechanic" of the case law to the ordinary
research scientist of the Marquis proposal. So interpreted, the
"basic patent" standard envisioned by Marquis is lower than the
present constitutional standard and thus is squarely interdicted
by the Constitution.
B. THE PREIIISE THAT A PURPOSE OF THE PATENT CLAUSE IS TO
PROMOTE INVESTMENT, MARKETING, OR CoMMERcE
The argument that "[t] he basic aim of the patent system is
to encourage inventing by making it more profitable"708 is super-
ficially appealing to many who seemingly are unaware that such
an aim has no basis in the Constitution. The constitutional
patent clause authorizes a reward to inventors but says nothing
at all about financial backers, commercial developers, assignees,
investors, or any other type of "money man." While the Con-
stitution does not preclude the profit that may accrue to these
third parties as a result of, or as an incident to, the reward given
to a bona fide inventor for a true invention satisfying the con-
stitutional standard, it decidedly does not authorize Congress to
plan patent legislation for the benefit of these businessmen.
Upon careful reading of the controlling Supreme Court prece-
dents, no other conclusion is possible.
In 1829, in Pennock v. Dialogue,77 the Supreme Court first
stressed the cornerstone premise that the Constitution authorizes
patents for a primary public purpose to which even the inventor's
reward is subordinate. The Court has never deviated from, and
has continued to emphasize,78 this dominant public interest as
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 79. This argument rests very heavily on the doubtful
premise that because other countries authorize patents for merely novel
advances, the United States should do likewise. See id. at 69-70. Many
European patent systems, including that of England from which the
American system is partially derived, utilize commercial success-gener-
ally measured by sales-as a primary test of inventive merit. Thus it
is argued that the American patent system is historically and logically
under an obligation to operate in the same way. This contention, along
with apposite English precedent, was exhaustively discussed and
squarely repudiated in McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419 (1891), a case
cited with approval in Graham. 383 U.S. at 12.
77. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 19 (1829).
78. In addition to cases discussed in the text, see, for example,
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530-31 (1972);
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the cornerstone of patent policy. As it stated in Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co.,7 9 "the primary
purpose of our patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes
for the owners of patents ....
In Wilson v. Rousseau,"l the Court again stressed that purely
financial interests evoked no sympathy under the patent clause:
Congress had not at all in view protection to assignees [of
patents] .... [T]heir condition on account of dealing in the
subject of the invention, whether successful or otherwise, was
not in the mind of that body, nor can any good reason be given
why it should have been.
They had purchased portions of the interest in the invention,
and dealt with the patent rights as a matter of business and spec-
ulation; and stood in no different relation to the government or
the public than other citizens engaged in the common affairs of
life.8 2
In other words, as recognized by Robinson in the introduction
to his 1890 treatise on patents, the underlying theme of the Con-
stitution and all patent laws enacted under it "has been to en-
courage original invention. The introduction of those inventions
into use [and hence necessarily the profitability thereof] was
wisely left to the incentive of business enterprise.1
83
Echoing the Court, Congress has perceived in the words of
the clause conferring its patent power "that the good of society
was the only thing provided for, or intended to be provided
for.,84
This primary public interest is itself a factor in making cer-
tain that the high minimum standard of patentability mandated
by the Constitution is not diluted. As the Court noted in Mahn
v. Harwood:8 5
In cases of patents for inventions, a valid defense... often
arises where the question is, whether the thing patented amounts
Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313,
343-45 (1971); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 674 (1969); Mercoid
Corp. v. id-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665-66 (1944); United
States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942); Kendall v. Winsor,
62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 329 (1858); Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 292,
320 (1833).
79. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
80. Id. at 511.
81. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 646 (1846).
82. Id. at 678 (emphasis added).
83. W. ROBINSON, THE LAw OF PATENTs FOR UsEFUL INVENTIONs
11.4-5 (1890).
84. H.R. REP. No. 1494, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1894). See also H.R.
REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1909).
85. 112 U.S. 354 (1884).
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to a patentable invention....
... And it is no doubt a general rule that where the Com-
missioner has exceeded his authority in granting . .. a patent,
such fact furnishes a good defense to a suit brought for its in-
fringement. There are stronger reasons for this defense against
patents for inventions, which directly affect the citizen, than ex-
ist in the case of patents for land, which directly affect the gov-
ernment, and only indirectly the citizen.8 6
With striking similarity, a 1945 decision referred to the para-
mount interest of the public "in seeing that patent monopolies
spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable
conduct and that such monopolies are kept within their legiti-
mate scope."87
The evils of proliferating patents on trivia and thereby in-
verting the constitutional order of priorities so as to put inves-
tors, entrepreneurs, and other businessmen-in the Court's words,
"speculative schemers"--in a favored position relative to the
rights of the community were aptly described in the 1883 deci-
sion in Atlantic Works v. Brady:88
The design of the patent laws is to reward those who make
some substantial discovery or invention, which adds to our
knowledge and makes a step in advance in the useful arts. Such
inventors are worthy of all favor. It was never the object of
those laws to grant a monopoly for every trifling device, every
shadow of a shade of an idea, which would naturally and spon-
taneously occur to any skilled mechanic or operator in the ordi-
nary progress of manufactures. Such an indiscriminate creation
of exclusive privileges tends rather to obstruct than to stimulate
invention. It creates a class of speculative schemers who make
it their business to watch the advancing wave of improvement,
and gather its foam in the form of patented monopolies, which
enable them to lay a heavy tax upon the industry of the country,
without contributing anything to the real advancement of the
arts. It embarrasses the honest pursuit of business with fears
and apprehensions of concealed liens and unknown liabilities of
lawsuits and vexatious accountings for profits made in good
faith.8 9
86. Id. at 358-59 (emphasis added). The direct effect upon the citi-
zen must be viewed in context with the recognition in Greene v. McEl-
roy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959) and Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578,
589-90 (1897), of the right of every citizen to pursue an ordinary calling,
unhampered by interfering monopolies that might impede enjoyment of
that right. This recognition in Greene and Allgeyer derives from a con-
curring opinion in Butchers Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746,
762 (1884), by Justice Bradley, the author of the Mahn decision.
87. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance
Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945).
88. 107 U.S. 192 (1883).
89. Id. at 200. This was another opinion authored by Justice Brad-
ley. See note 86 supra.
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In short, the suggestion to encourage "invention" of trivia
by holding out patents as the guaranteed return to the investor
who finances the underlying "research" is without foundation
in Constitution, statute, and judicial precedent. In the same
vein, the attempt to relate the guarantee of patent availability
on every merely novel item to such marketplace considerations
as "headstart" advantages and developments and production
costs90 is invalid. These commercial considerations are of no con-
cern under the patent clause.
The attempted correlation between marketplace considera-
tions, including commercial success, and the "sufficiently useful
and important" criterion of pre-1952 statutory law was repeat-
ediy rejected by the Supreme Court. In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood
itself, the patentee and the dissenting Justice unsuccessfully es-
poused the view that the doorknob covered by the patent in suit
should be sustained as patentable because it was "better and
cheaper" than antecedent doorknobs, despite the insignificance
of the differences.9 1 A similar argument in Reckendorfer v. Fa-
ber 92 was again unsuccessful. In Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Auto-
matic Devices Corp.,93 the patentee argued that the Hotchkiss
interdiction of patents on advances within the purview of those
of ordinary skill in the pertinent art was wrong and should be
overruled. The Court unanimously disagreed. In Graham, the
Court put marketplace considerations, including commercial suc-
cess, in proper perspective by explaining that they were "second-
ary"94 and "may have relevancy" 915 in some instances, but never
when the "invention ... rests upon exceedingly small and quite
nontechnical mechanical differences in a device which was old
in the art."96 In Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Sal-
vage Co.,97 the Court, quoting A&P, again emphasized that
such factors as commercial success, "without invention will not
make patentability."98
Obviously, if marketplace considerations cannot save a chal-
lenged patent from invalidity, they cannot afford a foundation
for planning new patent legislation with the purpose of legitima-
90. Marquis, supra note 15, at 80 et seq.
91. 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 254, 268.
92. 92 U.S. 347, 352 (1876).
93. 314 U.S. 84, 92 (1941).
94. 383 U.S. at 17.
95. Id. at 18.
96. Id. at 36.
97. 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
98. Id. at 61, quoting 340 U.S. at 153.
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tizing the grant of patents on alleged inventions that exhibit
mere novelty. Still further evidence that the patent clause is not
concerned with or directed toward the promotion of commerce
and industry, but only with the promotion of technological
advance-in other words, "progress--can be found in the Su-
preme Court decisions repudiating the assertion that patentees
have a duty to commercialize their inventions and holding that
even deliberate refusal to market a patented invention in no way
compromises the right to recover for infringement of a patent
that satisfies the constitutional standard.99 In short, arguments
that the Constitution recognizes a purpose of fostering a relation-
ship between the limited patent monopoly and the actual market-
ing of patented inventions run counter to Supreme Court prece-
dent and hence are invalid arguments on which to posit new
patent legislation.
C. THE PREISE THAT THE PATENT SYSTEM AS CURRENTLY AD-
MINISTERED STIMULATES RESEARCH
Even if a dual patent system, such as that advocated by Pro-
fessor Marquis, could constitutionally be implemented, it would
still be necessary to inquire whether the system could reasonably
be expected to serve its declared purpose of stimulating re-
search.10 0 Any discussion of what stimulates "research" must,
of course, proceed from an understanding of what is meant by
the term. The "research" conducted by those of ordinary skill
in an effort to cut costs, improve old products, commercialize
true inventions once made, or otherwise serve the business com-
munity first and the public second is not dependent on the exist-
ence of the patent system but must be pursued in striving for
profits. It necessarily follows that the incidence of this form
of "research" responds more readily to marketplace considera-
tions than to changes in the patent system. This was confirmed
in 1940 by Charles Kettering, then vice-president in charge of
research of General Motors Corporation, testifying before the
Temporary National Economic Committee. The testimony re-
flects Kettering's view that even in the absence of patent laws
General Motors would probably be required, by the sheer pres-
sure of competition in the automobile industry, to operate its
99. Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S.
24, 34-35 (1923); Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co.,
210 U.S. 405, 422-29 (1908).
100. See Marquis, supra note 15, at 71.
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industrial laboratories. 10 1
In a similar vein, the Wall Street Journal for February 6,
1975, reports that the current economic recession will not ad-
versely affect-and in many cases will significantly stimulate-
spending for research and development. The Journal quotes a
spokesman for Corning Glass Works, who stated that "[h]istori-
cally we have conscientiously spent more on research and devel-
opment when times are bad than when times are good."'10 2
Even research of a more basic nature, calculated to achieve
creative breakthroughs-true inventions which meet the consti-
tutional patentability standard but which usually are at least
one step removed from market-Teadiness when achieved-is not
necessarily dependent on the availability of patents and certainly
not on the availability of patents for trivia. Thus, in a Septem-
ber 1973 survey, conducted for the National Science Founda-
tion'03 to obtain information from corporations about the public
policy changes that might encourage them to finance larger in-
crements of this high-risk research, 0 4 the corporate interviewees
suggested that investment in fundamental research might best
be stimulated by specially negotiated depreciation allowances,
special income tax reduction provisions, or legitimatization of the
sharing of major developmental costs among several companies.
No interviewee suggested that any change in patent policy would
be a factor in stimulating such research investments, though sev-
eral expressed concern over the continued proliferation of invalid
patents, including trivial, nuisance patents.
Professor Marquis does not cite evidence to support the con-
trary assumption that more patents on trivia would encourage
more productive research. He does not refute the conclusion
reached by the Supreme Court in 1892, from which it has never
deviated, that it is "important to the public that competition
101. Hearings on Technology and Concentration of Economic Power
Before the Temp. Nat'l Economic Comm., 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 30,
at 16311 (1940-41).
102. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 6, 1975, at 1, col. 5.
103. ARTHUR D. LrrrLE, INC. & INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH, INC., BARRIEs
TO INNOVATION IN INDUSTRY-OPPoRTUNITIES FOR PUBLIC POLICY CHANGES
(1973).
104. Such research is considered "high-risk" because it might not
ever directly yield a marketable product or might do so only rarely,
whereas developmental and applied research routinely conducted on old
products usually results quickly in marketable variations and improve-
ments, albeit of a largely trivial and hence constitutionally unpatentable
nature.
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should not be repressed by worthless patents."10 5 He simply
echoes current organized patent bar opinion that greater avail-
ability of patents on greater numbers of trivial items, coupled
with certainty that they could be enforced, would somehow in-
crease funds available for fundamental research and ensure that
the expenditure of those funds would produce the creative results
that would advance technology--"promote the progress of science
and useful arts." Logic suggests that freer availability of patents
on trivia will encourage spending on "research" by those of or-
dinary skill, directed to the development of further trivia, but
nothing else. At the very least, unless and until convincing evi-
dence-not just patent lawyer opinion-is adduced to show a
meaningful relationship between the availability of patent pro-
tection for trivia and the availability of financing to support
creative research, all arguments calculated to influence liberal-
ized patent legislation as a spur to research investment should
be disregarded.
From the constitutional point of view, moreover, even if the
postulated relationship could be established by solid economic
evidence, there would remain the difficulty that the congres-
sional prerogative in the promulgation of patent legislation is
strictly limited to measures that will directly "promote the prog-
ress of science and useful arts." It does not extend to measures
that might do so, if the research undertaken produces a true
breakthrough. The patent system is permitted to hold out hope
of reward only to the few who actually promote progress by their
technological success; it cannot constitutionally guarantee a re-
ward to all those who try to promote progress by undertaking
research. It remains doubtful that research investment trends
are properly considered in designing new patent legislation.
The incentives to investment which the corporate inter-
viewees in the National Science Foundation study suggested-
depreciation allowances, income tax credits and deductions, and
provisions permitting industry-wide sharing of certain research
costs-could be promulgated as an exercise of congressional com-
merce and tax powers and ought accordingly to be studied with
care. These measures, however, are independent of patents and
should be kept so. If the patent laws are to harmonize with
their sole constitutional purpose, measures must be devised by
which the patent grant is unique, is awarded sparingly on ad-
vances that truly enhance human knowledge, and, once awarded,
105. Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892).
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affords protection that offers its recipients a hope of substantial
financial gain. Continued availability of patents as routine gov-
ernmental rewards for the performance of pedestrian tasks deni-
grates the patent grant and makes its monopoly power a tool of
the very "speculative schemers" criticized by the Supreme Court
in Atlantic Works.106
V. PRACTICAL DRAWBACKS OF A DUAL
PATENT SYSTEM
Putting aside constitutional and other legal obstacles, a dual
patent system would raise many practical difficulties. Among
these difficulties would be the aggravated workload of the Patent
Office, the difficulty in assessing the scope of patents, and the
wide variation in patentability standards fostered by the use of
opinion testimony.
Although an objective of the Marquis proposal is to reduce
the admittedly heavy workload of the Patent Office,107 adoption
of the proposal would aggravate-not alleviate-that workload.
The filing of patent applications on trivia could reasonably be
expected to mushroom if such patents were legitimatized. 08 In
view of the patent invalidity statistics under present practice, 10 9
it can hardly be expected that improvement would result, even
under a lowered patentability standard, if the workload were
thus made heavier." 0
106. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
107. See Marquis, supra note 15, at 68, 104.
108. As stated in Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 224(2d Cir. 1971), with reference to constitutionally unpatentable trivia, and
quoted with approval in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
485 (1974), "[tjhere can be no public interest in stimulating developers
of such know-how to flood an overburdened Patent Office with applica-
tions or [sic, for] what they do not consider patentable."
In testimony given in 1973 by the general patent counsel of Avco
Corporation, invalid patents and the applications on trivia which spawn
them were analogized to weeds which inhibit growth of a lawn. He con-
cluded, "we need to dedicate ourselves to the objective of putting the
best ideas on the table, getting them into the Patent Office, and dis-
couraging the chaff, discouraging the weeds, and doing the right amount
of pruning." See Hearings on S. 1321 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 138-39 (1973).
109. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
110. In his testimony before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trade-
marks and Copyrights in 1973, Milton Weissman, editor of the Journal
of the Patent Office Society and a career patent examiner for 29 years,
meticulously described a number of reasons for consistently poor Patent
Office performance. See Hearings, supra note 108, at 445-569. Addi-
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PATENT QUALITY STANDARDS
Nor is it realistic to suggest, as Marquis does, that by limit-
ing "improvement patents" to a single embodiment, the dual sys-
tem "should reduce the search and examination load." ' 1 The
Marquis proposal would impose numerous new duties upon the
Patent Office examining staff. These duties would continue
throughout the post-issuance period" 2 and, when coupled with
the increased filings encouraged by the system, would further
increase the burden on the Patent Office.
Moreover, the Marquis proposal would engender confusion
and uncertainty as to the status of issued patents. Lawyers at-
tempting to advise clients as to validity and scope of either a
"basic" or an "improvement" patent would be faced with a virtu-
ally impossible task because of the ease of interconversion, which,
whenever effected, would change the standard of patentable in-
vention required to sustain the patent and hence make necessary
a complete reevaluation of its validity. This uncertainty as to
validity, which is not a problem among lawyers today, 1 3 would
not be mitigated by the measure limiting the term of the inter-
convertibility to the five-year "improvement patent" term.1 4
Since patent claims could be amended to overcome defects at any
stage of the life of the patent, lawyers could never be sure of
their scope and hence could not effectively and confidently advise
tional reasons for this poor performance are developed in Sears, supra
note 15. Moreover, as pointed out in the concurring opinion in A&P,
"Et]he Patent Office, like most administrative agencies, has looked with
favor on the opportunity which the exercise of discretion affords to ex-
pand its own jurisdiction." 340 U.S. at 156.. In so doing the Office has
immersed itself in an all too familiar bureaucratic quagmire from which
it is incapable of extricating itself without firm congressional assistance.
Contrary to the assumptions made by Marquis, there is no evidence
that the current large outpouring by the Patent Office of constitutionally
invalid patents on trivia is attributable in any measure to "sympathy
for inventors." See Marquis, supra note 15, at 104. Most patents today
issue to corporate employers of inventors under circumstances that are
far too impersonal to generate much "sympathy."
111. Marquis, supra note 15, at 84.
112. Id. at 90-104.
113. Marquis erroneously suggests that "the gap between Patent Of-
fice and judicial standards of patentability ... has rendered the patent
validity opinions of even the best attorneys little more than speculation
in many cases," id. at 79, but cites no evidence. In the author's experi-
ence, it is not difficult to render an authoritative validity opinion, given
the stability of authoritative judicial precedent regarding the patentabil-
ity standard. The difficulty, if any, arises only when a lawyer first ad-
vises a client to obtain a patent on a triviality and then the client wants
to enforce it in a court-and this difficulty would disappear if the consti-
tutional prohibition on trivial patents were enforced by the Patent Office.
114. Id. at 77-79.
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clients on how to avoid infringement. The very function of
patent claims-to apprise the public of what is monopolized dur-
ing the life of the patent and of what is freely available for pub-
lic enjoyment after its expirationn"-would be compromised or
even destroyed by this constant opportunity to shift the scope
of a claim.
Finally, the use of "opinion testimony of scientists1 1 6 as the
basis for evaluating the technical importance of an alleged inven-
tion and for gauging the "ordinary inventive skill of the scientist
engaged in research 'll" would substitute mere opinion for solid
evidence-the "basic factual inquiries""18 which are the touch-
stone for making the legal determination currently enunciated
in section 103. Furthermore, scientists, being of searching and
skeptical mind, tend to espouse widely divergent opinions,"19 with
the result that vast diversity would occur among the evaluations
required to determine the issue of patentability. This would
raise serious questions of fairness and due process, both between
different "basic patent" applicants and vis-a-vis the rights of the
community.
VI. CONCLUSION
Succinctly stated, a patent system in which one tier or track
of patents is granted on subject matter that is merely novel can-
not be justified either constitutionally or practically. The pres-
ent statutory standard of patentable invention, which is judi-
cially enforced with notable consistency, is constitutional. And,
because it is directly responsive to the constantly rising level of
ordinary skill in the arts and sciences, this standard is as flexible
as the Constitution itself. All indications are that the real need
is for the development of procedures that will permit and en-
courage the Patent Office to discharge its single responsibility
of issuing only valid patents by conforming strictly to this con-
stitutional standard.
115. See, e.g., United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S.
228, 232 (1942); General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S.
364, 369 (1938).
116. Marquis, supra note 15, at 72.
117. Id.
118. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
119. Marquis acknowledges that "it is more likely that there will be
too many proposed definitions than too few," Marquis, supra note 15,
at 73, but he fails to take note of the equal likelihood of wide variation.
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